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ABSTRACT
In many countries, local government size is increasingly thought to be insuﬃ-
cient to operate eﬃciently. Two possible solutions to this problem are amal-
gamation and intermunicipal cooperation. This paper applies a novel
methodology to shed light on the eﬃciency implications of this choice.
Using a unique and rich micro-level dataset, we ﬁnd that intermunicipal
organisations (IOs) in the Netherlands consistently pay higher interest rates
than municipalities, while there is no economic reason to do so. We interpret
this as a form of ineﬃciency. Municipal amalgamation, on the other hand,
does not result in higher interest rates. Our analysis eliminates one possible
explanation, dispersed ownership of IOs, as the number of partners cooperat-
ing in an IO does not aﬀect interest rates (no ‘law of 1/n’). This leaves the
introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation, and the
ensuing reduction in monitoring, as the most probable explanation.
KEYWORDS Intermunicipal cooperation; municipal amalgamation; eﬃciency; law of 1/n; local
government borrowing
1. Introduction
In many countries, local governments are believed to have a suboptimal size
for oﬀering public services eﬃciently, because of scale economies and
because of spending spillovers. That is especially true in countries where
amalgamation is rare or non-existent or where substantial public tasks have
been decentralised recently. Local government can increase operating scale
through amalgamation, through cooperation with other local governments
and by contracting out to, or partnering with, private operators that also
work for other local governments. Each of these options may have very
diﬀerent implications. Contracting out requires a competitive market, which
does not exist for many services for which local government is responsible.
Results have often been disappointing (Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010). The
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same goes for public–private partnership (Andrews and Entwistle 2010). This
paper focuses on amalgamation and cooperation.
Amalgamations often lead to public resistance because communities fear
loss of autonomy or identity. Larger jurisdictions may be less able to tailor
local services to local demand (Oates 1972). Moreover, amalgamation is a
blunt instrument. Services oﬀered by municipalities are quite heteroge-
neous. While for some (e.g., capital intensive) services they might operate
under economies of scale, for other services the opposite may be true.
Hence, increasing scale across the board could invoke eﬃciency gains in
some public services and eﬃciency losses in others. In addition, amalgama-
tion may result in more bureaucracy.
Intermunicipal cooperation oﬀers municipalities a way to increase scale of
production for selected public services only, while continuing to provide
other public services on a municipal level, and preserving local autonomy.
Although intermunicipal cooperation is a widespread phenomenon (Hulst
and Van Montfort 2007), its eﬀects on eﬃciency have not been extensively
studied.
Cooperation may allow municipalities to exploit economies of scale (Bel,
Fageda, and Mur 2013), but it may also have eﬀects that reduce eﬃciency.
Corporate governance theory predicts that cooperation exacerbates agency
costs and reduces the intensity with which the activities of public servants
are monitored. A control system combining monitoring with sanctions and
rewards (henceforth referred to as ‘monitoring’) is needed to align public
servants’ objectives with those of citizens. Agency theory suggests three
possible reasons for reduced monitoring, and, as a result, less eﬃciency, in
intermunicipal organisations (IOs). First, an extra tier in the hierarchy is
introduced: the board of the IO. Adding hierarchical layers increases mon-
itoring costs. Monitoring could be further hampered by the fact that the
municipal governments’ grip on an IO is weaker than that on their own
organisation. In addition, intermunicipal cooperation in eﬀect creates a
common pool. When a particular municipality puts a lot of eﬀort into
monitoring an IO, much of the ensuing eﬃciency gain will beneﬁt other
participants. As a result, the level of monitoring is likely to be lower than
that for the operations of the municipality itself. As this disincentive to
monitor is a result of the existence of a common pool, its strength will
depend on the size of this pool.
Empirical studies of intergovernmental cooperation often focus on deter-
minants of cooperation (e.g., Feiock, Steinacker, and Park 2009; Hefetz and
Warner 2011, Rodrigues, Tavares, and Araújo 2012). Studies on the eﬀects of
intermunicipal cooperation are mostly case studies or survey studies (e.g.,
Henderson 2015). Bel and Warner (2015) survey the literature, and ﬁnd just
eight econometric studies of the eﬀect of cooperation on public service
costs or spending. All of these study solid waste services, one of them in
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combination with water, electricity and gas. Results of these studies are
mixed. Frère, Leprince, and Paty (2014) ﬁnd no eﬀect of cooperation on total
spending of French municipalities.
The results of econometric studies on the eﬀects of municipal amalgama-
tions, carried out in several European countries and in Israel, are mixed as
well (see Allers and Geertsema, forthcoming and the references therein). In
the United States, neither city–county consolidation nor city–city consolida-
tion seems to result in signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains (Leland and Thurmaier
2010; Gaﬀney and Marlowe 2014).
Empirical studies of the eﬀects of cooperation or amalgamation often
focus on spending levels. Higher spending does not necessarily point to
increased ineﬃciency, however. Eﬃciency depends on the ratio of output
(or outcome) over input. Higher spending may simply reﬂect rising public
service levels, leaving eﬃciency unaﬀected. Empirical studies in this ﬁeld
suﬀer from two fundamental problems (Geys and Moesen 2009). The
scarce output indicators that are available are sometimes only crude
proxies for the true level of public good provision. Moreover, such studies
rely on strong assumptions (e.g., regarding the cost function), or they are
vulnerable to data errors (if they use data envelopment analysis). Because
all previous papers on the eﬀects of intermunicipal cooperation focus on a
service, waste, for which output is easy to quantify, the ﬁrst problem does
not necessarily apply to them. Indeed, output and quality are controlled
for in some of these studies (e.g., Bel and Costas 2006; Zafra-Gómez et al.
2013).
Our approach is completely diﬀerent from that of previous studies.
Whereas previous studies on the eﬀects of intermunicipal cooperation
cover all costs of providing a single service, we focus on a single cost in a
broad range of public services. We exploit a unique and rich micro-level
dataset on the price both municipalities and IOs pay for a standard com-
modity: credit. We compare interest rates on loans to Dutch IOs, amalga-
mated municipalities, and municipalities that were not amalgamated. The
credit risk for these loans is identical (i.e., zero). On identical loans, munici-
palities and IOs should be able to get the same terms. Thus, any systematic
diﬀerences in interest rates would point ceteris paribus to diﬀerences in
eﬃciency, without having to rely on strong assumptions inherent in the
approaches chosen by previous studies.
We ﬁnd that IOs pay higher interest rates than municipalities, while there
is no economic reason to do so. We also ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of lower
interest rates outweigh the extra bargaining cost they would require by a
wide margin. Consequently, we interpret the higher interest paid by IOs as a
form of ineﬃciency. However, the number of participating municipalities
does not aﬀect the interest rate paid by an IO. Thus, it is cooperation as such
that results in higher interest rates, not the number of parties involved. This
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leaves the introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation
and the limited inﬂuence of municipality governments on IO boards as the
most probable explanations.
2. Institutional background
Municipalities and intermunicipal organisations
Dutch municipalities are democratically governed jurisdictions with a broad set
of responsibilities. Municipalities often cooperate to perform speciﬁc tasks, ran-
ging from refuse collection to administering social welfare beneﬁts. Cooperation
is often aimed at reaping economies of scale. Other reasons to cooperate are that
somemunicipalities are simply too small to perform every task independently, or
that the catchment area of a public service exceeds the municipality’s
boundaries.
Dutch IOs cannot levy own taxes. In some cases, a grant is received from
the central government, but most of their resources come from the partici-
pating municipalities. There are no limitations with respect to the number of
cooperative arrangements, and municipalities are free to choose diﬀerent
partners for each (except for some cases where cooperation is mandatory,
e.g., for ﬁre brigades). The Joint Provisions Act enables municipalities to
create public bodies, which are separate administrative entities that may
employ staﬀ, own assets, borrow money, etcetera. In case of ﬁnancial dis-
tress, the participating municipalities are liable. Public bodies do not default.
Municipalities may also create public companies under private law. Unlike
public bodies, public companies can default, in which case shareholding
municipalities lose their investment and creditors (part of) their claim. This
does not happen often. In practice, municipalities occasionally bail out
ﬁnancially troubled public companies they participate in.
Municipalities are free to leave a public body or terminate their participa-
tion in a public company. In practice, however, this is not an easy step. The
public services in question must then be provided by the municipality itself,
or a diﬀerent IO is to be joined. That may not always be feasible. Moreover,
breaking up requires that all partners agree on a division of property and
debt. There are no general rules for this.
Apart from these two main forms of cooperation, several other, looser
types exist, e.g., foundations and informal communities of government
oﬃcials in charge of speciﬁc public services. An alternative to intermunicipal
cooperation is municipal amalgamation.
Almost every year, some Dutch municipalities are amalgamated.
Amalgamation may be voluntary or mandatory, depending on the case
(see Allers and Geertsema, forthcoming). The number of municipalities
gradually decreased from 572 in 1997 to 408 in 2013. With over 40,000
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inhabitants on average, Dutch municipalities are large compared with those
in other countries (Allers and Geertsema, forthcoming).
Local government borrowing
There are no legal limits to the amounts municipalities or IOs can borrow
(Allers 2015). There is no default risk associated with loans to municipalities.
Dutch municipalities never go bankrupt, and neither do intermunicipal
public bodies. The Financial Relations Act stipulates that a municipality
may apply for a supplementary grant if revenues are signiﬁcantly and
structurally insuﬃcient to cover necessary outlays. Bailouts occur often
enough to be credible for potential lenders: 10 times in 1998–2014 (Allers
2015). This explicit bailout guarantee enables Dutch municipalities to bor-
row cheaply.
Unlike public bodies, public companies sometimes go bankrupt, although
this happens rarely. Some of the loans to such companies are guaranteed by
local governments. Non-guaranteed debt of public companies does carry
credit risk, and is excluded from this study.
Most local governments borrow from banks; some of the bigger munici-
palities may hold loan auctions or issue bonds. Two Dutch banks specialise in
loans to local governments, BNG Bank and NWB Bank. Apart from these
banks, of which all shares are held by the central government and subnational
governments, municipalities and IOs may borrow from commercial banks.
3. Theory and practice of risk-free credit
Theory
Both for municipalities and for public bodies, default risk is zero. Thus, there
is no theoretical reason for banks to require diﬀerent interest rates for loans
to municipalities and to public bodies. For public companies, default risk is
positive, but credit risk is zero, as their debt is guaranteed by default-free
municipalities. However, some legal or administrative costs might be
incurred in case a loan guarantee needs to be enforced, despite the oﬃcial
legal mechanisms in place for such situations. As a result, loans to public
companies might carry more interest than those to public bodies and
municipalities.
Practice: lending
Interest rates are not determined solely by the rate of return the bank
requires; they are the result of negotiations between lenders and borrowers.
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We interviewed representatives of BNG Bank on the way interest rates are
determined.
The bank builds a so-called pricing yield curve by ﬁrst connecting the
funding interest rates for diﬀerent maturities, based on a formal term
structure model, and then adding surcharges for proﬁt and cost (which
may depend on principal and maturity), a liquidity premium (if applicable)
and a surcharge for cost of capital (‘usage of balance sheet’). The exact
formula and its parameters are the result of a highly formalised adminis-
trative decision procedure that needs approval from the executive board.
Before the start of every business day, current interest rates are fed into the
system which then automatically provides the bank’s client desk with the
pricing yield curve.
The purpose of the loans included in this study is immaterial to the bank
as credit risk is zero. Moreover, municipalities usually do not borrow for
speciﬁc projects. Rather, the municipality’s treasurer reviews the entire
capital needs of his or her organisation and borrows accordingly. Such
loans are not lines of credit, though: the principal is lent and paid back
according to the agreed amortisation schedule.
Actual interest rates are a result of negotiations, usually by telephone or
email, between the bank’s client desk and the borrower. For the client desk,
the pricing curve is exogenous and serves as a reference. It may oﬀer lower
rates than this curve suggests in order to attract extra business on days with
ample supply, or when the interest rate on the international market has gone
down during the day (recall that the pricing yield curve is calculated before
the start of every business day). Borrowers aware of the latter are likely to
secure better deals than borrowers who do not spend time to collect market
information. BNG Bank’s client desk for risk-free loans consists of four persons,
who share a single oﬃce. Three of them were at this client desk during our
entire research period; one of them joined it during our research period. Each
of them is able to follow negotiations carried out by his or her colleagues.
Each of them arranges loans for both municipalities and IOs.
This setup ensures that, on the part of the bank, both types of borrowers are
treated in the same way, by the same persons, following the same procedures
and using the same pricing curve. Any systematic diﬀerences in risk-free inter-
est rates between municipalities and IOs are likely to originate from the
borrowers’ behaviour. Borrowers can obtain somewhat lower interest rates by
negotiating well. This requires some general knowledge about credit markets,
up-to-data information about current market conditions, and time.
Practice: borrowing
Figure 1 describes the decision making process of borrowing money by
municipalities and IOs. Ultimately, municipalities and IOs serve their citizens.
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Citizens periodically vote to re-elect or dismiss the municipal government.
Ceteris paribus, higher costs (e.g., higher interest rates) result in higher local
taxes or less public services. Both diminish the local governments’ re-elec-
tion chances (Allers 2012), which provides an incentive to operate eﬃciently.
The municipal government delegates day-to-day operations to manage-
ment, which supervises the ﬁnance oﬃcer who arranges loans.
In the case of IOs’ borrowing, there is an additional link in the chain of
command: the general board of the IO. Note, however, that this relation-
ship is not as hierarchical as Figure 1 might suggest, and that it is shared
with other municipalities. Its strength may depend on the legal form of
the IO. A public body is governed by a general board containing members
of municipal councils or aldermen from the participating municipalities. It
is the general board, not the councils of the participating municipalities,
that adopts the public body’s budget. This budget determines how much
participating municipalities contribute. The municipal councils may
express their views on the proposed budget, but they have to accept
the public body’s board’s decision and authorise payment of the bud-
geted contributions.
The board managing a public company operates even more indepen-
dently: it enjoys almost complete autonomy vis-à-vis local government













Figure 1. Decision-making authority with respect to local government borrowing.
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representatives of the participating jurisdictions, but they must act in the
interest of the company and are not accountable to the municipal councils.
4. Theory and hypotheses
The delegation of decision-making authority introduces the problem that,
due to asymmetric information and divergent interests, agents will not
automatically act in the best interests of their principals. Figure 1 shows in
eﬀect a series of principal–agent relationships, with the citizen as principal,
the ﬁnance oﬃcer as agent, while elected oﬃcials and public managers act
both as principals and as agents. Agency theory assumes agents to have a
negative utility for eﬀort and a positive utility for money. It describes how a
control system of monitoring, sanctions and rewards (referred to as ‘mon-
itoring’) is needed to align the agent’s objectives with those of the principal
(e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983). In our case, monitoring applies to the over-
sight on ﬁnance oﬃcers who arrange loans, but also on public managers,
who are responsible for hiring competent ﬁnance oﬃcers; etc. Less monitor-
ing will result in less eﬀort by the agent.
Optimal monitoring requires trading oﬀ costs and beneﬁts. Adding an
additional hierarchical layer increases monitoring costs while leaving bene-
ﬁts unaﬀected. This suggests that persons arranging IO loans are monitored
to a lesser extent than those arranging municipalities’ loans; the same
applies to their bosses (Figure 1). A second reason to expect less monitoring
is the fact that the municipal governments’ grip on the IO’s board is weaker
than the grip on its own staﬀ, which raises monitoring costs. IOs operate
with a considerable degree of independence, and ﬁnancial problems are
ultimately shifted to the participating municipalities.
To make matters worse, agency theory suggests an additional problem:
dispersed ownership (Sørensen 2007). Public services provided through
IOs are ﬁnanced from a common pool; hence, the costs are shared with
other municipalities. Consequently, when a municipality decides on the
amount of eﬀort (cost) that should be put into monitoring an IO, it will
take into account that any eﬃciency gains from putting in that eﬀort will
only partly beneﬁt the municipality itself, since they will be shared with all
other participants (free rider problem). This is likely to result in a level of
monitoring that is lower than that for the operations of the municipality
itself.
The public choice literature, however, provides a diﬀerent perspective,
assuming that citizens are unable to eﬀectively oversee their elected repre-
sentatives. This allows politicians to collect rent: they can divert public
resources to further their own goals, e.g., to improve their chances of
being re-elected. In our case, it could be attractive for politicians to obtain
campaign contributions from banks in exchange for higher interest rates on
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loans. Decision making in IOs is further removed from politicians than
decision making in municipalities, and more diﬀerent politicians are
involved. As a result, it is more diﬃcult for a particular politician to exploit
the organisation’s resources and transaction costs are higher (Sørensen
2007). This could result in lower interest rates for IOs.
Thus, theoretically, intermunicipal cooperation may result in lower eﬃ-
ciency because of reduced monitoring (agency theory), and to higher eﬃ-
ciency because of less political meddling (public choice). The net eﬀect is
uncertain. Marvel and Marvel (2007), using US data, found that the level of
monitoring for services provided by other governmental organisations is
lower than that for the operations of the municipality itself. We expect the
same for our case. Here, political meddling seems to be less relevant than in
other settings. As a publicly held company, BNG Bank never makes dona-
tions to politicians or organisations involved in campaigns. Indeed, the only
donations BNG Bank makes are to the BNG Culture Fund, an independent
organisation, which donates to cultural projects selected by experts in the
ﬁeld. This arrangement, and the small amount available for distribution (one
million euro per year, while there are over 400 municipalities), make political
interference in interest rates on loans from BNG Bank very unlikely. Thus, we
hypothesise that intermunicipal cooperation reduces monitoring eﬀort and
therefore leads to higher interest costs.
Hypothesis 1: IOs pay higher interest rates than municipalities on equiva-
lent loans.
Higher interest rates paid by IOs would not necessarily point to ineﬃcient
borrowing practices. Because public companies can go bankrupt and muni-
cipalities and public bodies cannot, lenders could charge the former higher
interest rates in order to cover possible legal or administrative costs of
enforcing a loan guarantee. Then, higher interest paid by public companies
would not be the result of ineﬃcient borrowing practices. Defaults of public
companies are exceptional in the Netherlands. Moreover, oﬃcials of BNG
Bank whom we interviewed told us that the costs of retrieving a loan in such
a case are negligible.
Hypothesis 2: Public companies do not pay higher interest rates than
public bodies.
If Hypothesis 2 is accepted, we conclude that IOs could pay less interest.
However, this would require more eﬀort (collecting market information;
negotiating). Only if the beneﬁts of putting in this extra eﬀort exceed the
costs can we conclude that IOs borrow ineﬃciently.
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Hypothesis 3: Beneﬁts of extra bargaining eﬀort by IOs would exceed
costs.
Accepting hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 would suggest that IOs borrow ineﬃ-
ciently. The question then arises why that would be the case. As described
above, agency theory suggests three possible reasons for reduced monitor-
ing, and, thus, less eﬃciency in IOs: the introduction of extra hierarchical
layers, the limited inﬂuence of municipality governments on IO boards; and
dispersed ownership of IOs.
We test the validity of the last explanation by investigating whether
interest rates increase with the number of participants in an IO. Several
papers argue that ineﬃciency due to common pool eﬀects increases with
the number of participants, a phenomenon called the ‘law of 1/n’ (Weingast
1979; Primo and Snyder 2008). In the case of a particular municipality
putting eﬀort into monitoring an IO, the share it receives of the gains
from that eﬀort are proportional to 1/n.
Although empirical ﬁndings supporting the law of 1/n exist in several
contexts (e.g., Baqir 2002), some authors have raised questions. Primo and
Snyder (2008) give examples of cases where a ‘reverse law of 1/n’ may hold.
This is in line with Tornell and Lane (1999), who model a situation where
each participant has an outside option. This means that, for the most
eﬃcient organisation as well as for others, participating must be at least
as attractive as leaving. As n goes up, ineﬃciency must be curbed to satisfy
that condition. As municipalities are free to join or leave IOs, this model may
be relevant here.
The public choice literature also supports a ‘reverse law of 1/n’. It predicts
that decision making in IOs is more eﬃcient because it is further removed
from politicians than within municipalities. As the number of participants
grows, it gets more diﬃcult for an individual politician to exploit the
organisation’s resources, as transaction costs are higher.
Thus, theoretically, a higher number of cooperating municipalities may
result in lower eﬃciency because of reduced monitoring, but also in higher
eﬃciency because of less political meddling and because participants have
an outside option. The net eﬀect is uncertain. Earlier in this section we argue
that, in our case, political meddling seems to be less relevant. Moreover, as
explained, in the Dutch case there are several barriers to leaving an IO.
Therefore, we hypothesise that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.
Hypothesis 4: The interest rate paid by IOs increases with number of
participating municipalities (i.e., the ‘law of 1/n’ holds).
Accepting Hypothesis 4 implies that dispersed ownership (partly) explains
why IOs pay higher interest rates than municipalities.
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Amalgamation might also aﬀect monitoring eﬀort. Amalgamation is an
arduous process that may have severe disruptive eﬀects on managerial
behaviour and organisational outcomes, e.g., because of poor staﬀ morale,
loss of managerial expertise due to increased turnover, and work overload
(Andrews and Boyne 2012). On the other hand, amalgamation might have a
beneﬁcial eﬀect on eﬃciency. Existing organisations usually have well estab-
lished ways of doing things, which might have become outdated.
Amalgamation forces organisations to reconsider procedures and opera-
tions, possibly resulting in more eﬃcient practices (Hansen, Houlberg, and
Holm Pedersen 2014). Again, the net eﬀect is uncertain. We hypothesise that
the ﬁrst, eﬃciency-reducing, eﬀect dominates, but that it is smaller than for
cooperation:
Hypothesis 5a: After amalgamation, municipalities pay higher interest
rates than not (recently) amalgamated municipalities.
Hypothesis 5b: Interest rates paid by recently amalgamated municipalities
are lower than those paid by IOs.
5. Method and data
Our units of observation are individual loans. We have data on four types of
loans with ﬁxed interest rates made by BNG Bank, which is the market leader
in this ﬁeld:
(1) Short-term loans (up to 1 year); principal and interest are due at
maturity.
(2) Long-term loans where amortisation and interest is paid in equal
instalments (annuity).
(3) Long-term loan where the principal is paid back in equal instalments
(linear).
(4) Long-term loans where the principal is paid back at maturity (bullet).
Purchase or sale of loans, reﬁnancing before maturity is reached, restructur-
ing, consolidation of loans and loans with no ﬁxed interest rate or standard
amortisation schedules are left out of our dataset. Reﬁnancing at maturity is
included. We select loans to municipalities and public bodies, and loans to
public companies which are guaranteed by municipalities. All loans in our
sample are oﬃcially free of credit risk.
Interest rates vary a lot over time and over amortisation schemes. In order
to compare interest rates of diﬀerent loans, we relate them to reference
interest rates that apply to the same dates and amortisation schedules. Our
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dependent variable is the interest rate diﬀerential (IRD), deﬁned as the
relative diﬀerence between the actual interest rate rj on loan j and the
reference interest rate rref : IRDj ¼ rjrrefrref . By using a relative measure, we
automatically control for macro-economic factors inﬂuencing interest rates.
The IRD may be interpreted as follows: if, e.g., IOs have an average IRD that
is 0.05 higher than that of municipalities, then, other things being equal,
they spend 5% more on interest payments.1
We use the interest rate indicated by BNG Bank’s pricing yield curve
as the reference interest rate. As explained, this reference rate is exo-
genous to the staﬀ manning the bank’s client desk. For long-term loans,
reference rates based on the bank’s pricing yield curve are available for
the most common maturities only: both 5 and 10 years for bullet loans,
5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years for loans with linear amortisation and 10, 15,
20 and 25 years for loans with annuity amortisation. We select loans for
which reference rates are available, and exclude loans with less com-
mon maturities from our main analysis. We also exclude outliers (obser-
vations with an IRD above 0.25 or below −0.25). An extensive sensitivity
analysis shows that these choices do not aﬀects results (see supple-
mental data).
We have data for 1997–2013. For short-term loans, however, data is
available for 2006–2013 only. For each loan, we have data on the identity
of the borrower and on the loan characteristics that inﬂuence interest
rates. In our regressions, we use principal, maturity, market volatility and
forward start (number of days between contract and start of the loan) as
controls, and we run separate regressions for diﬀerent amortisation sche-
dules. Market volatility is measured as the coeﬃcient of variation of the
reference interest rate in the previous ten business days. In order to allow
for non-linearity, we also include the square of these variables.
Furthermore, we include year dummies to control for nationwide factors
inﬂuencing IRDs.
Data taken from the bank’s administration are combined with data we
collected through a survey of IOs: number of participating municipali-
ties, ﬁeld of activity and legal form. These characteristics are subject to
change over time (see also Gradus, Dijkgraaf, and Wassenaar 2014). We
deﬁne number of partners as equal to 1 in case of loans to municipa-
lities and equal to the number of participating municipalities for loans
to IOs.
We use two dummy variables for amalgamation: one indicating whether
a municipality has been amalgamated in the year of the loan or up to
3 years before, and one indicating whether it has been amalgamated
4–8 years before the loan was made. Thus, we can distinguish short run
eﬀects from long-term eﬀects of amalgamation.
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Our dataset contains 11,301 obser-
vations, of which 10,307 are loans to 433 diﬀerent municipalities, and 994
are loans to 113 diﬀerent IOs. In those 113 IOs, 389 diﬀerent municipalities
participate, ranging from very small to very large.
6. Empirical results
Do IOs borrow ineﬃciently?
Table 2 shows regressions of IRDs on a dummy that takes the value of one if
the loan was made to an IO, and on a number of control variables.2 The ﬁrst
column includes all loans in our dataset. Columns 2–5 concern speciﬁc types
of loans. In many cases, the control variables are highly signiﬁcant, especially
for long-term loans which are more heterogeneous than short-term loans.
Overall, the included variables explain diﬀerences in IRDs quite well.
We now turn to the central question of this paper: do IOs pay higher
interest rates than municipalities? The answer is quite straightforward. The
coeﬃcients of the IO dummy are positive and highly signiﬁcant for all loan
types. IOs pay 3–5% more interest on equivalent loans. This conﬁrms
Hypothesis 1 (see Figure 2).
Higher interest rates paid by IOs do not necessarily point to ineﬃcient
borrowing practices. Recall that public companies can (and sometimes do)
go bankrupt and public bodies cannot. Thus, lenders might want to charge
the former higher interest rates in order to cover costs associated with
enforcing loan guarantees in case of default. In that case, the higher interest
paid by public companies would not be the result of ineﬃcient borrowing
practices. One might even argue that our result that IOs pay higher interest
rates may be driven partly or wholly by this reason. We now test Hypothesis
Table 1. Summary statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Entire sample
Interest rate 11,301 2.093 1.922 0.050 6.820
Principal (million euro) 11,301 7.665 12.25 0.091 278.495
Maturity (years) 11,301 5.972 8.411 0 25
Forward start (days) 11,301 25.32 129.4 0 2,193
Number of partners 11,301 1.543 2.400 1 35
Volatility 11,301 0.012 0.009 0.001 0.088
IRD 11,301 −0.012 0.084 −0.250 0.250
IOs
Interest rate 994 1.684 1.561 0.090 5.620
Principal (million euro) 994 4.911 8.273 0.010 66.086
Maturity (years) 994 3.782 6.502 0 25
Forward start (days) 994 15.59 74.20 0 923
Number of partners 994 7.178 5.539 2 35
Volatility 994 0.012 0.010 0.001 0.088
IRD 994 0.027 0.072 −0.248 0.250
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2, stating that interest rates paid by public companies are not higher than
those paid by public bodies.
Table 3 presents regression results for IOs only. As extra control
variables we add dummies representing the ﬁelds in which IOs are active.
Table 2. Regressions of interest rate diﬀerential (IRD): basic analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet
IO 0.0432*** 0.0475*** 0.0464*** 0.0271*** 0.0438***
(0.00405) (0.00536) (0.00981) (0.00329) (0.00836)
Principal (million euro) −0.000815** −0.000869* −0.000855 −0.000607*** −0.000609**
(0.000398) (0.000502) (0.000778) (0.000155) (0.000244)
Principal squared 3.21e-06 3.32e-06 2.55e-05 6.25e-06*** 3.44e-06
(3.02e-06) (3.35e-06) (2.23e-05) (2.05e-06) (3.75e-06)
Maturity (years) −0.00201*** −0.00544 −0.00886*** 0.00191***
(0.000559) (0.0138) (0.00293) (0.000658)
Maturity squared 5.99e-05*** 0.00394 0.000248*** −5.52e-05*** 4.04e-05
(1.72e-05) (0.00863) (8.27e-05) (1.88e-05) (4.41e-05)
Volatility 0.464 0.582* 0.289 0.775*** 0.806
(0.297) (0.350) (1.624) (0.206) (0.633)
Volatility squared 3.707 3.801 7.457 −18.72*** −26.97
(6.810) (7.658) (56.88) (5.128) (16.55)
Forward start (days) 0.000208*** 0.00176 0.000212*** 0.000194*** 0.000338***
(1.38e-05) (0.00142) (1.47e-05) (1.38e-05) (4.43e-05)
Forward start squared −5.93e-08*** −5.34e-05 −6.76e-08*** −4.57e-08*** −2.06e-07***
Observations 11,301 6,822 306 3,673 500
R-squared 0.210 0.165 0.717 0.697 0.678
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies included.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 3. Regressions of IRD of IOs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet
Legal form: public body 0.00241 0.00297 0.00609
(0.0120) (0.0139) (0.0125)
Inverse of number of partners (1/n) −0.0318 −0.0172 −0.658 −0.0146 0.0176
(0.0384) (0.0590) (5.101) (0.0272) (0.101)
Field: welfare provision −0.0220 −0.0165 0.0891 −0.0548***
(0.0186) (0.0208) (0.972) (0.0136)
Field: work provision for disabled −0.00725 0.00472 −0.0384 −0.0348*** −0.0227
(0.00944) (0.00996) (2.907) (0.0108) (0.0271)
Field: environmental services 0.00840 0.0246** 0.0996 −0.0184 0.0253
(0.0105) (0.0100) (0.997) (0.0138) (0.0478)
Field: public health −0.00656 −0.0151 −0.0150 0.0746
(0.0130) (0.0241) (0.0159) (0.0743)
Field: public safety −0.0103 −0.00711 −0.153 −0.0371*** −0.0377**
(0.0142) (0.0213) (1.718) (0.0118) (0.0152)
Field: business development 0.0119 0.0136 −0.0219
(0.0184) (0.0202) (0.0213)
Observations 889 631 25 197 36
R-squared 0.098 0.084 0.959 0.408 0.978
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls (see Table 2) and year dummies included. Observations
where legal form is unknown are excluded.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
730 M. A. ALLERS AND B. VAN OMMEREN
That is because in some ﬁelds, a particular legal form or number of
participants is more prevalent than in others. The control variables con-
cerning individual loan characteristics (shown in Table 2) are included as
well, but we do not report their coeﬃcients. Our dataset does not
contain any annuity or bullet loans to public companies (see Table A1
in the supplemental data), which explains the blanks in those columns.
For short-term loans and for linear loans, the coeﬃcient of the dummy
variable public body is close to zero and far from signiﬁcant. That means
that we observe no diﬀerence in interest rates compared with public
companies. Thus, we cannot reject Hypothesis 2. IOs pay higher interest
rates while there is no economic reason to do so.
Thus, presumably, IOs could pay less interest, but no doubt this would
require more eﬀort (collecting market information; negotiating). Only if the
beneﬁts of putting in this extra eﬀort exceed the costs (Hypothesis 3) can
we conclude that IOs borrow ineﬃciently. A simple calculation can put this
into perspective. For IOs in our sample, average loan size is 4.9 million euro
and average interest rate 1.7% (Table 1). Thus, yearly interest paid on the
average loan is 83,000 euro. Paying 3–5% more in interest means paying
2500–4000 euro more annually. Over 3.8 years (average maturity, Table 1)
that amounts to 10,000–15,000 euro per loan (present value, calculated
using average interest rate in sample). Assuming wage costs of 100,000
euro (which is generous) and 228 working days per year (the Dutch
average), 10,000 euro buys 23 days of staﬀ. Thus, spending an extra couple
of hours or even days in order to secure a lower interest rate would be a
very proﬁtable investment. Hypothesis 3 is supported. IOs borrow
ineﬃciently.
Is dispersed ownership part of the explanation?
Agency theory suggests three possible reasons for reduced monitoring,
and, as a result, less eﬃciency in IOs: the introduction of extra hierarch-
ical layers as a result of cooperation, the limited inﬂuence of municipality
governments on IO boards; and dispersed ownership of IOs (common
pool problem). If dispersed ownership would contribute to ineﬃciency,
we would expect interest rates to increase with the number of partici-
pants in an IO (Hypothesis 4). This is tested in Table 3. In our dataset, the
number of participants (n) varies from 2 to 35 (Table 1). In order to
directly test the ‘law of 1/n’, we include 1/n in the regressions. In each
column, the coeﬃcient is far from signiﬁcant.
Thus, our evidence does not support the ‘law of 1/n’. This implies that it is
cooperation as such that results in higher interest rates, not the number of
parties involved.
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Eﬀect of amalgamation
We now investigate whether amalgamation aﬀects interest paid by munici-
palities. In Table 4, the regressions in Table 2 are extended with two
amalgamation dummy variables. The coeﬃcient of none of these is signiﬁ-
cant for any of the loan types. Municipal amalgamation does not aﬀect IRDs,
neither in the short run nor in the long run. Using a diﬀerent cut-oﬀ for our
amalgamation dummies, or using or a linear amalgamation variable instead
(number of years since amalgamation), does not change our conclusions
(not reported).
Thus, Hypothesis 5a, which states that amalgamation temporarily
leads to higher interest rates, is rejected. Moreover, this conﬁrms
Hypothesis 5b, that amalgamated municipalities have lower IRDs than
IOs (Figure 2).
7. Sensitivity analysis
It might be argued that the decision to cooperate may not be independent
of a municipality’s eﬃciency. For example, eﬃcient municipalities could be
less likely to cooperate because they already enjoy low costs, or more likely
to cooperate because they are more attractive partners. Then, we would be
comparing IOs, which comprise relatively (in)eﬃcient municipalities, with a
group of both ineﬃcient and eﬃcient municipalities. As we have seen,
however, the IOs included in our database have participants from 389
Table 4. Regressions of IRD on cooperation and amalgamation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet
IO 0.0426*** 0.0464*** 0.0482*** 0.0271*** 0.0438***
(0.00421) (0.00563) (0.00926) (0.00331) (0.00835)
Amalgamated 0–3 years before −0.00312 −0.0113 0.0141 0.00138 0.000783
(0.00586) (0.00982) (0.00998) (0.00124) (0.00439)
Amalgamated 4–8 years before −0.00455 −0.00764 0.000849 −0.000354 −0.000157
(0.00480) (0.00780) (0.00456) (0.00144) (0.00348)
Observations 11,301 6,822 306 3,673 500
R-squared 0.210 0.166 0.720 0.697 0.678
Only municipalities that participate in IOs included in regressions
IO 0.0400*** 0.0438*** 0.0532*** 0.0267*** 0.0441***
(0.00471) (0.00638) (0.00952) (0.00328) (0.00910)
Amalgamated 0–3 years before 0.00108 −0.00566 0.0209* 0.00165 1.90e-05
(0.00709) (0.0109) (0.0121) (0.00138) (0.00624)
Amalgamated 4–8 years before −0.00393 −0.00650 0.00236 0.000336 0.00493
(0.00559) (0.00839) (0.00522) (0.00188) (0.00386)
Observations 8,711 5,405 233 2,735 338
R-squared 0.213 0.173 0.760 0.690 0.666
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables (see Table 2) and year dummies included.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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diﬀerent municipalities, while the total number of municipalities was 572 in
1997 and 408 in 2013. Thus, the majority of municipalities participate in the
IOs we study. Still, as a robustness check, in the lower panel of Table 4, we
include only municipalities that participate in at least one of the IOs we
study. The results are very similar to those in the upper panel of Table 4.
Five additional sensitivity tests are detailed in the supplemental data. First,
we re-run regressions, now including uncommon maturities for which no
reference interest rates are available, using interpolated values for reference
interest rates. Second, we use a random eﬀects model instead of an ordinary
least squares speciﬁcation. Furthermore, we allow previously excluded outliers
with an IRD above 0.25 or below −0.25 in our regressions, and apply diﬀerent
H1. IOs pay higher 
interest rates than 
municipalities
•Reject 
H2. Public companies 
do not pay higher 
interest rates than 
public bodies
•Reject →  higher interest might be result of cost of 
enforcing loan guarantees; in that case, perhaps public 
company cannot borrow more cheaply
H3. Benefits of extra 
bargaining effort by IOs 
would exceed costs
•Reject → IOs do not 
borrow inefficiently
H4. Interest rate paid 
by IOs increases with 
number of participating 
municipalities
•Reject → dispersed ownership of IOs 
does not explain higher interest rate
H5a. After amalgamation, 
municipalities pay higher interest 
rates than other municipalities
•Reject → no evidence that 
amalgamation creates inefficiency
H5b. interest rates paid by 
recently amalgamated 
municipalities are lower than 
those paid by IOs
• Accept → IOs could borrow more cheaply
• Accept
• Accept → IOs borrow inefficiently
• Accept → dispersed ownership 
(partly) explains higher interest
• Accept → amalgamation creates inefficiency
Figure 2. Summary of hypotheses tested.
Note: Test outcomes are printed in black, discarded options in grey.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES 733
thresholds. In addition, we test whether our results are driven by big munici-
palities able to secure cheap loans because of a superior bargaining position.
Finally, we check whether results are robust to our choice of control variables.
The sensitivity analysis shows that our results are quite robust.
8. Conclusions
Local government size is the subject of a lively debate. Municipalities
sometimes seem too small to be able to perform all tasks that are
nowadays expected from them, to beneﬁt from scale economies, or to
avoid interjurisdictional spillovers. Such problems may be addressed
through national reforms, e.g., amalgamating small jurisdictions into
bigger ones, or promoting intermunicipal cooperation in ﬁelds where
scale matters most. In some cases, local governments operating on a
small scale can themselves make a choice between amalgamation and
intergovernmental cooperation. Ideally, the choice of jurisdiction size
and the extent to which local governments cooperate should be guided
by a comprehensive trade-oﬀ of costs and beneﬁts. Eﬃciency eﬀects
are, of course, only part of this trade-oﬀ. Many diﬀerent aspects need to
be considered, e.g., the eﬀect of jurisdiction size on the quality of the
democratic process (Denters et al. 2014). Still, eﬃciency is an important
subject, as many local governments struggle to make ends meet. This
paper applies a novel methodology to shed light on the implications of
intermunicipal cooperation and amalgamation for operating eﬃciency.
Econometric research on the eﬀects of intermunicipal cooperation on
costs is scarce and focused on one particular service: solid waste collection.
We choose a diﬀerent approach, comparing the price Dutch IOs, amalga-
mated municipalities and not-amalgamated municipalities pay for an iden-
tical commodity: risk-free credit. We ﬁnd that IOs pay signiﬁcantly higher
interest rates.
The higher interest paid by IOs cannot be explained by possible legal or
administrative costs associated with enforcing guarantees on loans to public
companies. That is because there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in interest rates
on loans to public companies (which may default, but which borrow under
guarantee from the participating municipalities) and public bodies (which,
under Dutch law, cannot default). Thus, there is no economic reason why
IOs should be required to pay higher interest rates than municipalities.
Interest rates are the outcome of a bargaining process, which is costly. It
requires general knowledge about credit markets and up-to-date information
about market conditions. If the cost of extra bargaining eﬀort would exceed
the beneﬁt from somewhat lower interest rates, IOs would not be borrowing
ineﬃciently, even though interest rates could be reduced. We show, however,
that this is not the case. The beneﬁts of lower interest rates outweigh the
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extra bargaining cost they would require by a wide margin. Consequently, we
interpret the higher interest paid by IOs as a form of ineﬃciency.
The outcome that cooperation reduces eﬃciency is consistent with
agency theory, but not with public choice theory. Agency theory predicts
that less monitoring of employees and managers reduces eﬃciency. There
are three reasons to expect that monitoring of IO staﬀ and operations is
looser than in municipalities: the introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a
result of cooperation, the limited inﬂuence of municipality governments on
IO boards; and the fact that IOs are owned by a group of municipalities
(dispersed ownership), which might create a free rider problem.
If it is dispersed ownership that drives our results, we would expect the
number of partners in an IO to aﬀect the interest rate. With more participants, a
smaller part of any eﬃciency improvement beneﬁts a particular municipality,
reducing the incentive to put eﬀort into monitoring the IO. However, we ﬁnd
that the number of participants does not aﬀect the interest rate paid by an IO.
Our outcomes do not support the ‘law of 1/n’. That does not necessarily mean
that dispersed ownership does not create a free rider problem, however; there
might be a diﬀerent eﬀect working in the opposite direction, leaving a zero net
eﬀect. For example, it might be necessary to curb ineﬃciency in IOs with more
participants, to prevent the most eﬃcient partners leaving the IO. Still, our
result implies that it is cooperation as such that results in higher interest rates,
not the number of parties involved. This leaves the introduction of extra
hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation and the limited inﬂuence of
municipality governments on IO boards as the most probable explanations.
Attempts to improve IO eﬃciency may be targeted on these issues.
Amalgamation, we ﬁnd, does not lead to higher interest rates. Not even
in the short run, where one might suspect the amalgamating process to
divert time and eﬀort from operational processes.
Of course, interest is only one of many costs, and not the most important
one. We use interest as an indicator, a ‘canary in a coalmine’, because
controlling for individual loan characteristics enables a clean comparison
between municipalities and a broad range of IOs. Further research is needed
to investigate whether municipal cooperation creates ineﬃciencies that
extend beyond paying higher interest rates. If higher interest costs in IOs
are indeed caused by insuﬃcient monitoring, as suggested by agency
theory and our results, we would expect ineﬃciencies elsewhere in IOs,
too. Such ineﬃciencies should be compared with possible gains resulting
from economies of scale in order to determine the net eﬀect of cooperation
on eﬃciency. As noted, the results of previous studies of the eﬀects of
Intermunicipal cooperation are mixed. It would be interesting to apply our
method to countries where these eﬀects already have been studied in a
diﬀerent way, and compare the outcomes.
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Notes
1. More precisely, if the IRD of IOs exceeds the IRD of municipalities by x, the
former pay x rrefrmunicip as much in interest. That is because IRD








age value of rrefrmunicip in our sample is 1.02, this factor will usually be negligible.
Thus, if we ﬁnd a diﬀerence in IRD of 0.05, that implies that 5.1% more is paid
on interest (0:05 1:02 100%).
2. Reported standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity and for correlation
between observations for identical organisations.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Bieuwe Geertsema, who worked with them on the working paper
version of this paper, Ralph Boltong and Remco Zwetheul for educating them about
the practicalities of local government borrowing, Hans Moerman for help with data
retrieval, Hans de Groot, Hans Leenaars, Jacob Veenstra, Wouter Vermeulen and the
referees for useful comments on a previous version of this paper, and Marloes van
Gelder and Lieneke Janzen for excellent research assistance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Maarten A. Allers is a professor of the Economics of Sub-National Government at the
University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands, and director of the Centre for
Research on Local Government Economics (COELO). His teaching activities focus on
public ﬁnance. His research interests include public ﬁnance, local government eco-
nomics, ﬁscal federalism, local taxation and political economy.
Bernard van Ommeren works for the main Dutch public sector bank, BNG Bank, as a
strategic consultant with a focus on sound municipal ﬁnances. He is currently work-
ing towards a PhD degree at the University of Groningen. His scientiﬁc research
focusses on the price of risk free credit.
References
Allers, M. A. 2012. “Yardstick Competition, Fiscal Disparities, and Equalization.”
Economics Letters 117: 4–6. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.076.
Allers, M. A. 2015. “The Dutch Local Government Bailout Puzzle.” Public
Administration 93: 451–470. doi:10.1111/padm.12123.
Allers, M. A., and J. B. Geertsema. Forthcoming. The Eﬀects of Local Government
Amalgamation on Public Spending, Taxation and Service Levels. Evidence from 15
Years of Municipal Consolidation, Journal of Regional Science.
736 M. A. ALLERS AND B. VAN OMMEREN
Andrews, R., and G. Boyne. 2012. “Structural Change and Public Service Performance:
The Impact of the Reorganization Process in English Local Government.” Public
Administration 90: 297–312. doi:10.1111/padm.2012.90.issue-2.
Andrews, R., and T. Entwistle. 2010. “Does Cross-Sectoral Partnership Deliver? An
Empirical Exploration of Public Service Eﬀectiveness, Eﬃciency, and Equity.”
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20: 679–701. doi:10.1093/
jopart/mup045.
Baqir, R. 2002. “Districting and Government Overspending.” Journal of Political
Economy 110: 1318–1354. doi:10.1086/342804.
Bel, G., and A. Costas. 2006. “Do Public Sector Reforms Get Rusty? Local Privatization
in Spain.” The Journal of Policy Reform 9: 1–24. doi:10.1080/13841280500513084.
Bel, G., X. Fageda, and M. Mur. 2013. “Why Do Municipalities Cooperate to Provide
Local Public Services? An Empirical Analysis.” Local Government Studies 39: 435–
454. doi:10.1080/03003930.2013.781024.
Bel, G., X. Fageda, and M. Warner. 2010. “Is Private Production of Public Services
Cheaper than Public Production? A Meta-Regression Analysis of Solid Waste and
Water Services.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 29: 553–577.
doi:10.1002/pam.v29:3.
Bel, G., and M. E. Warner. 2015. “Inter-Municipal Cooperation and Costs: Expectations
and Evidence.” Public Administration 93: 52–67. doi:10.1111/padm.2015.93.issue-1.
Denters, B., M. Goldsmith, A. Ladner, P. E. Mouritzen, and L. E. Rose. 2014. Size and
Local Democracy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. “Separation of Ownership and Control.” The
Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301–325. doi:10.1086/467037.
Feiock, R. C., A. Steinacker, and H. J. Park. 2009. “Institutional Collective Action and
Economic Development Joint Ventures.” Public Administration Review 69: 256–270.
doi:10.1111/puar.2009.69.issue-2.
Frère, Q., M. Leprince, and S. Paty. 2014. “The Impact of Intermunicipal Cooperation
on Local Public Spending.” Urban Studies 51: 1741–1760. doi:10.1177/
0042098013499080.
Gaﬀney, M., and J. Marlowe. 2014. “Fiscal Implications of City-City Consolidations.”
State and Local Government Review 46: 197–204. doi:10.1177/0160323X14550719.
Geys, B., and W. Moesen. 2009. “Measuring Local Government Technical (In)
Eﬃciency.” Public Performance & Management Review 32: 499–513. doi:10.2753/
PMR1530-9576320401.
Gradus, R., E. Dijkgraaf, and M. Wassenaar. 2014. “Understanding Mixed Forms of
Refuse Collection, Privatization, and Its Reverse in the Netherlands.” International
Public Management Journal 17: 328–343. doi:10.1080/10967494.2014.935237.
Hansen, S. W., K. Houlberg, and L. Holm Pedersen. 2014. “Do Municipal Mergers
Improve Fiscal Outcomes?” Scandinavian Political Studies 37: 196–214. doi:10.1111/
scps.2014.37.issue-2.
Hefetz, A., and M. E. Warner. 2011. “Contracting or Public Delivery? The Importance of
Service, Market, and Management Characteristics.” Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory 22: 289–317. doi:10.1093/jopart/mur006.
Henderson, A. C., ed. 2015. Municipal Shared Services and Consolidation. New York:
Routledge.
Hulst, J. R., and A. J. G. M. Van Montfort. 2007. Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Leland, S. M., and K. Thurmaier. 2010. City-county Consolidation. Promises Made,
Promises Kept? Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES 737
Marvel, M. K., and H. P. Marvel. 2007. “Outsourcing Oversight: A Comparison of
Monitoring for In-House and Contracted Services.” Public Administration Review
67: 521–530. doi:10.1111/puar.2007.67.issue-3.
Oates, W. E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt: Brace and Jovanovich.
Primo, D. M., and J. M. Snyder. 2008. “Distributive Politics and the Law of 1/N.” The
Journal of Politics 70: 477–486. doi:10.1017/S0022381608080444.
Rodrigues, M., A. F. Tavares, and J. F. Araújo. 2012. “Municipal Service Delivery: The
Role of Transaction Costs in the Choice between Alternative Governance
Mechanisms.” Local Government Studies 38: 615–638. doi:10.1080/
03003930.2012.666211.
Sørensen, R. J. 2007. “Does Dispersed Public Ownership Impair Eﬃciency? The Case
of Refuse Collection in Norway.” Public Administration 85: 1045–1058. doi:10.1111/
padm.2007.85.issue-4.
Tornell, A., and P. R. Lane. 1999. “The Voracity Eﬀect, the American Economic.” Review
89: 22–46.
Weingast, B. R. 1979. “A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms.”
American Journal of Political Science 23: 245–262. doi:10.2307/2111001.
Zafra-Gómez, J. L., D. Prior, A. M. P. Díaz, and A. M. López-Hernández. 2013. “Reducing
Costs in Times of Crisis: Delivery Forms in Small and Medium Sized Local
Governments’ Waste Management Services.” Public Administration 91: 51–68.
doi:10.1111/padm.2013.91.issue-1.
738 M. A. ALLERS AND B. VAN OMMEREN
